Democracy In Central Asia: Sowing In Unfertile Fields? – Analysis

By: FRIDE

May 17, 2012

By Jos Boonstra

Central Asia is one of the most repressive regions in the world. Compared with the two other former-Soviet regions of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Central Asia shows the least inclination towards democratisation. Although the five Central Asian republics are very different from each other none can be labelled a democracy or even claim to have made substantial progress towards democratic practices.

The European Union (EU) in its 2007 Strategy for Central Asia set out to promote democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance. The EU is active in urging Central Asian regimes to respect human rights, has set up a regional Rule of Law Initiative and runs several projects focusing on good governance, but so far has not been able to advance in any substantial way on several other aspects of democratisation, such as parliamentary reform or capacity-building for political parties. Other democracy promoters such as the OSCE and UNDP are also hampered in exercising democracy promotion in Central Asia and so instead concentrate mostly on aspects that are seen as being less sensitive. However, the 2010 changes in Kyrgyzstan offered a window of opportunity and some donors, foremost the United States, have made a distinction between Kyrgyzstan and the other Central Asian states by investing in democratic reform there, while ignoring democracy in the other republics for security and economic related reasons.

Central Asia

This policy brief offers an overview of the state of democracy in Central Asia and seeks to explain why its development has been so disappointing in this region. It concludes with a few broader recommendations on how the EU could make use of its – albeit limited – room for manoeuvre in supporting the democracy agenda.

An unfavourable landscape

Kazakhstan has gone through a period of steep economic growth due to oil and gas exports. A middle class is emerging and the estimated 2011 GDP per capita of $13,000 almost doubles that of Turkmenistan ($7,500) and quadruples that of Uzbekistan ($3,300), which are second and third respectively of the five Central Asian countries. But little has been done to build a genuine democracy. The country is by and large dependent on its president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The narrow nexus of power relations and the lack of a broad political spectrum could turn out to be problematic when a successor needs to be chosen. Over the last few years Nazarbayev has mostly been concerned with enhancing his country’s image by securing the chairmanship of international organisations (the OSCE in 2010 and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 2011), and in polishing his own legacy by hiring well-paid consultants (including Tony Blair) to present Kazakhstan and its president as an unrivalled success story. The country’s dubious image was severely tainted in mid-December 2011 after months of oil worker strikes in the western city of Zhanaozen turned violent resulting in the deaths of several protesters and scores injured. Furthermore, parliamentary elections on 15 January, which according to OSCE observers did not meet fundamental democratic principles, were followed by a clampdown on opposition leaders.

Kazakhstan’s democratic prospects look bright in comparison with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both countries were labelled by democracy watchdog Freedom House as being among the nine ‘worst of the worst’ countries in the world. Uzbekistan, the most central and populous country in Central Asia, has since independence developed effectively into a police state led by President Islam Karimov. The country has problematic relations with all of its neighbours and has not been able to overcome its murderous image following the 2005 Andijan events in which hundreds of protesters were killed. Even though the EU has lifted sanctions, and the U.S. and NATO are on a reasonable footing with Tashkent ‒ in order to secure transit for the Northern Distribution Network as part of the war effort in Afghanistan ‒ little to no progress has been made in improving the human rights situation.

In Turkmenistan, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has created his own powerbase since he took control following the sudden death of President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006. This has not led to a democratic opening in the country, nor any signs of reform or even a rebuilding of the destroyed school system. Meanwhile, China, and to a lesser extent Europe, Iran and its traditional export partner Russia, have taken a keen interest in Turkmenistan’s enormous gas reserves. One slight positive development is that even though the country lacks any independent civil society or political opposition the president has undertaken small steps to build a managed democracy, for instance by allowing (controlled) opposition candidates for the presidential elections last February. However, Turkmenistan remains one of the most isolated and repressive countries in the world, on a par with Chad and North Korea.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack the natural resources to build a rent-seeking economy based on energy exports and therefore remain unstable developing countries. Despite – or because of this – both are more open and free than their three northern neighbours. Whilst the countries’ authoritarian tendencies seem to be of a similar nature to their hydrocarbon fuelled neighbours, they lack the capacity to build an effective police state and therefore need to accommodate foreign donors through some form of democratic practice.

Kyrgyzstan experienced a second regime change in 2010. The first came in 2005 when President Askar Akayev was removed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev in what can best be described as a coup rather than a genuine popular revolt. When President Bakiyev turned authoritarian and was removed in April 2010 following popular protests, hope emerged that the country’s track record of being open and having an active civil society would translate into meaningful and sustainable democratic reform. But the ethnic violence in June 2010 in the south of the country impeded this development, and rivalries between political leaders who lacked political parties but controlled major business interests threatened the already fragile state. Despite these setbacks the constitution was amended and Kyrgyzstan is now, on paper, a parliamentary democracy, and defied inter-ethnic tension and the threat of a north-south fragmentation to hold free and somewhat fair elections last October. But against this background the new president, Almazbek Atambayev, is likely to be more concerned with balancing power interests in the country than pushing for democratic reform. International donors committed $1.1 billion to Kyrgyzstan following the ethnic violence but tensions remain high and democracy promotion has been put on the backburner while the country remains in crisis response mode focused on short-term security concerns.

Tajikistan is led by authoritarian President Emomalii Rahmon who took power on the back of an initiative to end the civil war in 1997. The country does have a genuine opposition party (the Islamic Renaissance Party) in parliament, a remnant of the peace agreement. Nonetheless, tensions over the growth of Islam are rising in Tajikistan and the government is increasingly taking a hard- line approach towards different forms of opposition. The country is characterised by widespread and endemic corruption as well as severe security threats. Corruption by the elites is especially damaging since it blocks any economic development. Meanwhile the country’s fragile stability is at risk due to energy shortages, tensions with Uzbekistan over water resources, negative influences from Afghanistan (drug trade and radicalism) and a complete lack of economic opportunities for its young population, which in turn is increasingly moving to Russia to find work.

Surveying this landscape, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as the poorest countries in the region do offer limited space for a long- term democratisation process that is bottom-up in nature. And Kazakhstan occasionally seems inclined to take small steps towards a more open society. All three will need incentives and sometimes pressure in order to engage in democratic reform. Here the EU and U.S. can play an important role, however this is made more difficult due to the other interests (security and energy) both have in the region. Another complicating factor is the role of China and Russia as the most influential external actors in Central Asia; both are driven by factors other than values-based priorities, ones that in fact often run counter to encouraging democratic reform.

Stumbling blocks

There are four barriers to democratisation and ‘western’ attempts to support democracy in Central Asia:

First, democracy is seen by the leaders of Central Asia as a direct threat to their existence. The notion of democracy is at odds with the vested interests of the elites (ruling families and regional interests). They see democracy as a challenge to their position as well as to the stability they provide for their outside business partners ‒ Russia, China and to a lesser extent the EU, U.S., Turkey and India. This is why the regimes argue that the focus should be on the threat of terrorism and radical Islam rather than the democratic values that the Europeans and Americans are pushing. Security threats are indeed a concern but are caused by a myriad of factors rather than the one-dimensional emphasis Central Asian regimes place on extremism. Rather it is poverty, lack of opportunity for the new generation and inter-state and ethnic tension that seem to be the foremost threats to the stability of the states. In a sense the biggest threat to the Central Asian people are the regimes themselves, which suppress the people and choose regime security over state and human security.

Second, there are misconceptions about and a general distrust of democracy. Central Asian regimes (but also some western critics of democracy promotion) often argue that the historical development of Central Asia is different than other parts of the world and as a result their values cannot be squared with ‘western values’. Of course the mechanisms of democratic government can and should differ between societies, but the basic ingredients of a democracy such as free and fair elections, a transparent government, a parliament that holds government to account and a vibrant civil society are part and parcel of any democracy. Central Asian states agreed to these standards when they joined the UN and OSCE. It is not about pushing particular democratic models but fostering democratic practices. However, democracy often has a negative connotation among the general population in Central Asia because the concept is associated with the first decade of independence and thus linked to robber capitalism and uncertainty. Many Central Asians prize strong leadership, yet at the same time there are concerns about elite corruption and the lack of an independent justice system, effective governance and basic human rights. While Central Asian regimes might not cheer for democracy, the concept and its ingredients have been agreed to by the states.

Third, Central Asian regimes have developed most of the institutions of a democracy but lack democratic practice. For instance, the legal system is strong on paper but in reality is rarely implemented. These states are actuality façade democracies. They include a parliament and a judiciary with a basic division of power that really only exists on paper, and institutions, such as a few political parties and a civil society, that have been largely created to satisfy western powers and give civilians a feeling of state building. Central Asian regimes have become quite efficient in building a Potemkin democracy through establishing and funding civil society organisations (GONGOs) and regulating the existence of political parties in support of the government. The EU, U.S., OSCE and other actors interested in promoting democracy have found it increasingly difficult to criticise the lack of reform when all the institutions they have asked for have been put into place. But democracy promoters should not shy away from addressing deficiencies in the basic functioning of government, parliament, the judiciary, political parties and civil society. A more open and genuine debate is needed to address these shortcomings and to differentiate between democratic practice and façade institutions.

Fourth, the western powers that seek to promote democracy have suffered an identity crisis themselves and have been severely undermined by ‘double standard’ accusations. Authoritarian leaders argue that the U.S. should first look at its own shortcomings in their fight against terrorism, which have led to torture and misbehaving U.S. troops, before criticising others. Meanwhile Central Asian leaders argue that European officials get very cautious about highlighting democratic issues when energy security is at stake. The OSCE as a regional security organisation and a reference point for democratic practice has become largely irrelevant due to internal divisions over its human dimension and accusations by several former Soviet republics that western members should not preach democracy and human rights in the East while they have democratic and human rights shortcomings themselves. Western prescriptions for democracy and human rights can also be rebuffed by Central Asian regimes because there are alternatives to do business with, democracies such as Turkey and India that refrain from interfering in other countries’ domestic affairs. Last but not least, the U.S.’s and, even more so, the EU’s position in the world is in decline. In Central Asia this will be more significant post-2014 when NATO troops have largely withdrawn from Afghanistan, while Russia’s role in the region will remain stable and Chinese economic influence will continue to rise. Again, western leaders should not shy away from rebuffing inaccurate double standard accusations, while at the same time acknowledging that no democracy is perfect and therefore that the monitoring of human rights is essential everywhere.

What can Europe do?

The EU and its member states have been hesitant in making a strong case for democracy. Instead the focus has been on aspects of democratisation that circumvent rather than address the main problems of Central Asian authoritarian leadership. The state of democracy in the region is so poor that any activity that raises awareness or even better improves the quality and openness of governance should be applauded. However, the main challenge for European donors in Central Asia is to make sure that funding reaches those who genuinely desire change rather than ending up in the hands of corrupt elites.

While Europe’s space for boosting democracy support may be limited (with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan), it should continue to support judicial reform and projects for local governments and civil society. However, other activities remain more problematic, notably: working with parliaments that are mostly made up of ruling-party elites; supporting the development of political parties that are seen as a direct threat by most regimes; supporting improvements to election procedures that despite being guaranteed through law lack any concrete implementation; and engaging in democratic security sector reform, which is seen as too sensitive and possibly as a threat to the elites’ grip on power.

In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan there are few possibilities for democracy promotion under the current regimes. Little to no support for democracy promotion is provided by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) or European bilateral aid. A focus on the rule of law and human rights, as is currently the case, is a most realistic objective in both countries. However, more can be done in this regard by trying to connect these two areas to other policy areas such as energy. Increased support for the marginalised civil society in Uzbekistan and engaging with Turkmenistan on allowing some development of civil society groups needs to be part of the EU’s engagement if it is to build sustainable partnerships with these societies.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there are more possibilities. A whole range of democracy promotion tools and activities can be utilised in both countries, ranging from electoral assistance to media freedom and from parliamentary support to aspects of democratic security sector reform. Because both countries are partly dependent on development assistance and harbour fears of Chinese and Russian predominance in the region, Europe has some leverage that it could use to ensure that governments meet their obligations. This should apply in particular to fighting corruption, as it undermines a large part of the development assistance the EU provides. As well as putting pressure on the governments Europe could also further empower civil society organisations to monitor budgets and push for transparent governance in specific sectors, such as the electricity sector where there is a shortage in both countries and rampant corruption.

In Kazakhstan there are more opportunities than in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan but less leverage then in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Currently the EU is negotiating a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Astana and Brussels would do well to include additional and stronger provisions for democracy. The Kazakh government needs to be held to the promises that it has made if it wants to maintain a reasonably positive image in terms of development. In that sense the leadership should have to deliver on reform before it receives ‘western support’ for prestigious international positions, which was not the case when President Nazarbayev secured the OSCE Chairmanship in 2010 when the country failed to implement promised reform.

The EU could decide to devote special attention to Central Asia’s youth, as a recent Saferworld brief (Nobody has ever asked about young people’s opinions, March 2012) suggests. It is the future generation, often lacking opportunities when it comes to education and employment, that needs to be engaged about the merits (and shortcomings) of democratic rule. An open debate about the ‘stumbling blocks’ described above would help raise awareness among young people while also bringing Europeans and Central Asians around the table.

In addition to support through the EIDHR, initiatives encouraging youth activism could in future be taken up by the envisaged European Endowment for Democracy. This initiative if backed up with political will and substantial resources could be a way for Europe to express its commitment to democracy in the face of authoritarian rule in Central Asia. Most regimes will not applaud new democracy-related projects but would also be hesitant to flat-out reject such work while being members of the OSCE and UN and having committed to democracy in writing. Support would best be delivered to genuine grassroots civil society organisations, preferably through micro-grants with minimal bureaucratic hassle in combination with larger multi-year grants that involve partnerships between European and Central Asian civil societies in order to encourage the exchange of best practices.

Lastly, the EU or member states should consider developing a Civil Society Forum modelled partly on the EU’s Eastern Partnership experience and partly on the OSCE platforms which bring together ‘eastern’ OSCE countries’ civil society organisations. Currently there is little sustained contact between independent experts in different fields from the Central Asian region with their counterparts from Europe. In connection with the ‘closed’ Human Rights Dialogues (HRD) the EU occasionally organises ‘open’ civil society seminars in Central Asia. However, these events are difficult to organise in some Central Asian countries due to the restrictive nature of the governments and are often run by EU structures in collaboration with Central Asian governments. Setting up an annual Civil Society Forum in Europe for civil societies to exchange views and set an agenda for activities and research would be beneficial and should be developed to complement, not duplicate, the current practice of civil society seminars. Ideally it would be civil society organisations that set the agenda and Brussels (or other European capitals) providing the venue to ensure that all those who want to enlist can participate in discussing a variety of matters, including democracy.

Conclusion

The European Union is a relative newcomer to the region and only started building serious relations five years ago when it launched its Strategy for Central Asia. One of its priorities is to promote democracy, good governance, rule of law and human rights. So far the EU has not been able to devote specific attention to many aspects of democracy for the reasons outlined above.

The prospects for democratisation in Central Asia are dim and security risks caused by instability – including Arab Spring scenarios – are on the rise. It seems that for Europe engagement with Central Asian societies is a better choice than sanctions and isolation. However, it remains a balancing act between interests and values. Giving up on promoting values will not deliver lasting benefits for the EU. It will not suddenly help Europe achieve its strategic energy and security objectives, or make it as effective as China or Russia at meeting hard interests. Also, it should be society as a whole that is central to EU policies, not the authoritarian regimes that lack succession mechanisms and are therefore relatively short-term bets.

Targeted democracy support, a strong line on human rights and increased people-to-people contact is the way forward. This is why awareness raising initiatives and contact between civil societies are so important in building a genuine partnership and countering misconceptions about democracy. Central Asia cannot be discarded as unfertile soil for democracy, but it will take time and effort by the region along with support from Europe and other democracy supporters for real progress in developing democratic societies.

Author:
Jos Boonstra is Senior Researcher at FRIDE and Head of the EUCAM programme. The author thanks Giovanni Grevi, Jacqueline Hale and Tika Tsertsvadse for reviews of an earlier draft. Some parts of this brief were published previously in Jos Boonstra, ‘Who Cheers for Democracy in Central Asia’, in Marina Ohanjanyan and Jan Marinus Wiersma (eds.), ‘The (Social) Democratic Map of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia’ (Amsterdam 2012).

Source:
This article was published by FRIDE as EUCAM Policy Brief No 23 – May 2012, which may be accessed here (PDF).

FRIDE is a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe’s role in the international arena. It strives to break new ground in its core research interests of peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and development and humanitarian aid, and mould debate in governmental and non-governmental bodies through rigorous analysis, rooted in the values of justice, equality and democracy.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/17052012-democracy-in-central-asia-sowing-in-unfertile-fields-analysis/

Please find attached a new report of the Expert Working Group on
spring forced child labor in Uzbekistan.

The paper is distributed in English and Russian. Thank you in advance
for your attention.

Kind regards,

Sukhrobjon Ismoilov
Director, the Expert Working Group

Uzbekistan: Spring field activities – forced child labor continues

Despite Uzbek authorities’ high-sounding statements and adoption of
several national and international norms banning forced child labor
this practice is still wide spread in the country’s agricultural
sector. Moreover the practice of forced labor has also started
involving other groups of the population. A closer look at the
official statements reveals that the Uzbek authorities have never
acknowledged the forced child labor problem and have avoided any
public promise to eradicate it. The reason to it is simple – the
problem of forced child labor in harvesting cotton has turned into a
serious dilemma for the authorities; they fear to acknowledge this
problem and can’t solve it. Due to a low payment for the labor
involved in cotton harvesting not so many people have interest in
being engaged in this type of seasonal work. The majority of the
population of the labor age prefers incomes as labor migrants abroad.
Incomes from labor migration can’t just be compared to the payment for
cotton harvesting at home. The Uzbek minors, students and personnel of
the state-financed organizations are those groups of the population
whom the Uzbek authorities can still exploit easily.

From the first days of May the Uzbek youth at secondary schools,
lyceums and colleges in Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh, Syrdarya, Khorezm
regions and autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan were forced to
attend spring cotton cultivation activities. This type of work usually
includes weeding and hilling of the ground. It can be suggested that
the same type of practice with forced spring labor is taking place in
all other areas of the country. The minors from secondary schools
involved in this type of forced spring labor are 13-16 years old
(7-8-9th grades of school) and minors from lyceums and colleges are
16-18 years old.

From Monday to Friday the Uzbek youth involved in forced spring labor
attend the local cotton fields from 13.00 afternoon till 18.00
evening. And on Saturdays and Sundays they attend the cotton fields
from 09.00 of morning till 18.00 evening. Thus on Saturdays the
classes for these groups of children are cancelled. The sources say
the spring forced labor for the children would last until May 20-25.
This type of labor is not paid. The Uzbek authorities and other
organizers of the spring forced labor prefer to call this process as
“hashar” in Uzbek which stands for unpaid voluntary physical activity.

Children often reach the local cotton fields on foot accompanied by
their teachers and administration of the schools. They have to take
care of food and drinking water themselves and bring those items with
them to the fields. They take their food directly in the fields. There
are no proper facilities and conditions, including hygienic conditions
for the children to take their food in the fields there is no medical
personnel ready to check the health conditions of children regularly.

Nasiba, an 8th grade girl from a secondary school in Bukhara region
shares her observations: “Each day after our classes we do hilling in
the cotton fields. On Saturdays and Sundays our work starts from the
morning. We have to bring our own food and water with us. We have also
to bring our work instrument with us. It could be a picker or sickle”

Sardor, a college student from Samarkand region was able to buy
himself out from spring forced labor: “I am preparing for entrance
exams to the university right now. That is why I attend privately
hired tutors everyday. They have taken everybody from our college to
the cotton fields. I have reached a deal with the college deputy
director and gave 50 thousand Sums (approximately $ 20 USD under black
market rates). And now I am free both from classes and forced labor.
The major priority for me right now is preparation to entrance exams”

A beginning teacher at a lyceum in Karakalpakstan has also shared his
concerns: “I have started working in the educational sphere recently
after I finished the university three years ago. But for those three
years I have managed to hate my job. Sometimes it is so difficult to
understand whether I am a teacher or a farmer. During spring months we
are forced to be involved in weeding and hilling of the cotton plants;
during summer days we are forced to get involved in chiseling of
cotton plants; and during autumn season we are forced to gathering
cotton crops…Apart from that the teachers and pupils are forced to
cultivate special portions of lands in public parks specifically
appointed to different groups of pupils. We plant flowers, cultivate
the land, etc. I have been thinking to quit my job in the educational
sector if I find a better option”

More likely the problem of forced child labor in cotton cultivation
and harvesting will remain in Uzbekistan for many years yet. Not
finding enough political will to acknowledge the problem of forced
child labor and eradicate it fully the Uzbek authorities as always
prefer taking only symbolic measures which are far from a solution.

On 26 March 2012 the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers adopted Decree # 82
“On additional measures for 2012-2013 on implementation of the
Conventions on Forced Labor and Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labor ratified which Uzbekistan has ratified”. The Decree
introduced a Government Action Plan for 2012-2013. The Uzbek
authorities and diplomats have started advertising the above mentioned
Decree and Action Plan widely as a measure on countering forced child
labor in cotton harvesting. However neither Decree, nor the Action
Plan (the whole document comes in a 9 page document) acknowledges this
problem. The Action Plan has barely mentioned the forced child labor
in cotton harvesting just in one of the provisions – Activity # 18 of
the Action Plan says the following (highlighted by us – the Expert
Working Group):

“Carrying out monitoring of prevention of forced labor of pupils of
secondary schools in cotton harvesting; submitting an analytic report
on the findings of the suggested monitoring together with
recommendations to the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers; deadline for the
suggested activities – annually from August to October; Responsible
organizations – the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of
Population; the Ministry of Public Education; the Prosecutor General’s
Office; Council of Ministers of the autonomous Republic of
Karakalpakstan; regional hokimiats (regional administration – the
Expert Working Group) and Tashkent city hokimiat”.

The measure suggested in the government Action Plan raises many
questions: What is the need for the suggested monitoring if the
problem is already well studied? Why it is not possible to just ban
forced child labor in cotton cultivation and harvesting? Why the
government Action Plan aims at covering forced labor of just the
schoolchildren – what about the university, lyceum and college
students, personnel of the government funded organizations who also
face forced labor in Uzbekistan as the Convention on forced labor
implies different categories of population not just children? Why the
government Action Plan aims at monitoring the forced child labor
practice just from August to October – the Uzbek authorities use the
forced child labor during spring, summer and late autumn (November)
seasons as well?

There could be one common response to those questions. The Uzbek
authorities don’t actually want to eliminate the practice of forced
child labor in cotton cultivation and harvesting. However the ongoing
international criticism around this problem has been changing the
situation lately. The Uzbek authorities are forced to put at least
some minimal steps, even if at the level of amendments of existing
legal norms. The international community and the Uzbekistani civil
society should take all possible efforts to achieve full elimination
of forced child labor in cotton cultivation and harvesting in the
country.

By News Briefing Central Asia – News Briefing Central Asia

11 May 12

http://iwpr.net/report-news/uzbekistan-turkmenistan-among-worst-worst-civil-liberties

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been placed among the “worst of the worst” countries for political rights and civil liberties by the United States-based watchdog group Freedom House.

The watchdog group listed the two Central Asian states, along with North Korea, Syria, Somalia and Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea, amongst the bottom nine performers in its Freedom in the World Report 2012, released on May 1.

“Whereas prior to 2011 the ‘president for life’ phenomenon was principally associated with the Middle East, it is today more likely to apply to the long-term leaders of the former Soviet Union,” Freedom House said, noting that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were ruled by dictators from the Soviet past.

The two neighbours were branded “not free” along with 46 other countries including Tajikistan and Kazakstan; all four have been listed in this category in the last three annual Freedom House reports.

The best Central Asian performer this year was Kyrgyzstan, rated “partly free” for the second year running.

Vyacheslav Abramov, director of Freedom House in Kazakstan’s capital Almaty, said free speech had been “completely suppressed” in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for the past decade.

Independent journalists in both countries face numerous problems and work in “unbearable and hazardous” conditions, Abramov said.

“Journalists are persecuted, exposed to serious threats, and some of them are still imprisoned,” he added.

Turkmenistan is a one-party police state with no independent media. The security service is omnipresent, tapping phones, monitoring internet traffic and preventing people regarded as suspect from leaving the country.

Uzbekistan blocks news websites including the BBC, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America and IWPR, and in March and April it clamped down on individual journalists. (See Journalists Targeted to Deter Others in Uzbekistan.)

Kyrgyzstan may be doing slightly better than its neighbours but it cannot afford to rest on its laurels, according to Elina Karakulova, director of the Media Support Programme at the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan. For example, the Kyrgyz parliament has ordered the Ferghana.ru website to be blocked and has banned news outlets from rebroadcasting foreign media content during presidential elections.

The Freedom House report noted “deep divisions” between the majority Kyrgyz and minority Uzbeks, and said little progress had been made in bringing to justice those responsible for the bloodshed in June 2010, when more than 400 people were killed in and around the southern cities of Osh and Jalalabad.

Karakulova believes Kyrgyzstan should be doing better, and that the bar for Central Asian states is set very low.

“We’re ahead of Tajikistan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – we are the best of the worst,” she said. “That isn’t any consolation. If you look at our recent rankings, we’re marking time.”

This article was produced as part of News Briefing Central Asia output, funded by the National Endowment for Democracy.

If you would like to comment or ask a question about this story, please contact our Central Asia editorial team at feedback.ca@iwpr.net.

Posted 2012/5/10

Mr Mamir AzimovOn 18 March 2012, Mr Uktam Pardayev was refused an exit visa from Uzbekistan. On 29 March 2012, Mr Mamir Azimov was temporarily refused an exit visa; to date no new information has been received on his application.

Uktam Pardayev is Chairperson of the Independent Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (IHRSU) in the region of Djizak. Mamir Azimov is Chairperson of the Djizak region of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU). Both defenders were previously denied exit visas from Uzbekistan in 2008- see Front Line Defenders’ urgent appeal on this dated 28 July 2008 (https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/1515).

Uktam Pardayev and Mamir Azimov had both applied to the Otdel Viz I Registratsii (OVIR- Department of Visa and Registration) for exit visas as per state requirements for all citizens of Uzbekistan who wish to leave the country. Uktam Pardayev applied for an exit visa in December 2011 in order to travel to Germany. When he did not receive an answer to his application, he contacted the City and Regional Prosecutor’s Offices and the Department of Interior Affairs in Djizak. On 25 January 2012, the City Prosecutor’s office responded and Uktam Pardayev was subsequently interviewed by an unnamed National Security Service Officer at OVIR, who asked the defender about the type of human rights activities he was involved in.

On 7 February 2012, Utkan Pardayev received a letter from the Director of Djizak OVIR, stating that his request was temporarily denied. On 18 March 2012, the City Prosecutor’s office sent a letter to Uktam Pardayev confirming the OVIR’s decision and advising him to apply to the upper authorities should he wish to appeal the decision. An explanation behind the denial of an exit visa was not outlined in the letter. Mamir Azimov applied for an exit visa on 18 February 2012 in order to travel to Turkey. He received a letter from the Djizak OVIR on 29 March 2012, which stated that his application was being considered and that an exit visa from Uzbekistan was temporarily denied.

Front Line Defenders expresses concern at the denial of exit visas to human rights defenders Uktam Pardayev and Mamir Azimov, and the lack of explanations behind the refusals. Front Line Defenders believes that these actions are directly related to Uktam Pardayev and Mamir Azimov’s work in defending human rights in Uzbekistan, and constitutes an attempt by the authorities to restrain their movements and prevent them from carrying out their legitimate and peaceful work.

by Nathan Hamm on 4/25/2012 · 0 comments

The Cotton Campaign has sent a letter to Hillary Clinton to urge the Uzbek government to end the use of forced labor in the cotton industry. The letter (PDF) provides a good summary of the issues at hand in this year’s determination of Uzbekistan’s status in the State Department’s annual trafficking in persons (TIP) report.

The State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report identified negligible progress by the government of Uzbekistan to end the practice of forced labor, and it identified the government quota system as a root cause of the forced labor system of cotton production. Uzbekistan remained on the Tier 2 Watch List in 2011 for the fourth consecutive year, presumably because the Uzbek government had “a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act’s (TVPRA) minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to implement the plan” (22 USC § 7107). However, according to Ambassador George Krol, with whom we met recently at the Global Chiefs of Missions Conference, the Uzbek government has not accomplished much. The 2011 TIP report also recommended that the government of Uzbekistan invite a mission of the ILO to monitor the 2011 cotton harvest. This did not happen.

The letter argues that Uzbekistan’s lack of progress means it must be dropped to Tier III status. The only thing the government has done since last year’s determination was to declare its intent to police itself, which is really no different than what it said it would do last year. The only thing, the letter says, that can count as the type of legitimate progress that would justify keeping Uzbekistan at the Tier II Watchlist status would be Uzbekistan’s government inviting the International Labor Organization unfettered access to evaluate the 2012 cotton harvest.

The standard the Cotton Campaign sets in the letter is very reasonable. One could even argue it is generous to Uzbekistan’s government as it makes no specific demand for an immediate government response and even provides an opportunity for it to (unconvincingly) claim the ILO’s findings to be sobering and eye-opening.

That said, Uzbekistan’s government rarely budges in meaningful ways on human rights issues and can be expected to continue pushing its usual arguments on forced child labor. But, something has to give. The law on TIP tier determinations requires forward progress to avoid falling to a lower tier. The reporting of human rights organizations and independent media outlets absolutely clear that both children and adults are forced to work in the cotton fields and that the reasons for this are a direct result of state control of the cotton economy and orders from no lower than the prime minister to mobilize laborers to meet quotas. Additionally, there is little to suggest that Uzbekistan’s government has done anything so far this year beyond what it did last year to address child labor.

Great effort surely is and will be poured into avoiding a downgrade, but it is very difficult to see how one can be avoided giving the requirements of the law. Even with a downgrade, Uzbekistan’s importance to the NDN would certainly result in a waver of the sanctions that come with Tier III status. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan’s government would take the downgrade as an insult, and it would be paid for in other areas of the bilateral relationship.

http://registan.net/index.php/2012/04/25/cotton-campaign-calls-for-ilo-access-to-uzbekistan/

Please find attached a presser on persecution of a famour Uzbek
cinematograph and documentary director Abdulaziz Mahmudov.

This paper is distributed in English and Russian. Thank you in advance
for your attention.

Kind regards,

Sukhrobjon Ismoilov
Director, The Expert Working Group

Uzbekistan: Well-known Uzbek cinematograph and documentary director
Abdulaziz Mahmudov faces trumped up charges

Independent film and documentary director Abdulaziz Mahmudov, a
founder and owner of a private film studio “Abdulaziz M” in Tashkent,
faces trumped up criminal charges by the Uzbek law enforcement bodies.

The police officers of the criminal investigation unit of Mirabad
District Depart of Internal Affairs (Mirabad DDIA) of Tashkent city
visited his apartment in the beginning of April 2012 when Mahmudov
wasn’t at home. He lives alone. Having found about the visit of the
policemen from his neighbors Mahmudov fearing provocations decided to
live temporarily in a different place. Soon the policemen have again
visited his apartment for three times. Mahmudov have again learnt
about that from his neighbors.

The last police representative who visited Mahmudov apartment located
in house # 29/1, Apartment # 16, Kuylik-4 block, Mirabad district of
Tashkent city was an officer by name “Ramiz” (his mobile phone number
+99897 7476169). He has asked Mahmudov’s neighbor to tell him that the
police officers from Mirabad DDIA were looking for him and he should
visit police officer Elbek Hamraev in room # 310 in the building of
Mirabad DDIA as soon as possible.

Mahmudov has got in touch with the representative of Mirabad DDIA over
the phone and demanded to explain the reasons of the visits by
policemen to his apartment. The police officer told him that he had
participated in unsanctioned pickets in 1998 and that is why he should
arrive to the Mirabad DDIA.

Mahmudov says he hadn’t participated in any pickets in 1998. He thinks
it looks like an effort to trump up a criminal or administrative
charge against him and get him on the crook for his independent work
as a film director. Mahmudov fears illegal detention and arrest and
further trumping up of a criminal case against himself. Therefore he
is not thinking yet to visit the Mirabad DDIA as he was requested to
do. Moreover, nobody has officially invited him to do so.

Mahmudov’s latest work is a documentary named “Between Past and
Future. Ethnic Nationalism. Second film” devoted on June events of
2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan and inter-ethnic problems in post-Soviet
countries in general. The documentary was made in 2010 and currently
Mahmudov and his colleagues are preparing for its broader
presentation.

In April 2012 the government run company “Uzbekkino” (Uzbek Cinema)
has denied Mahmudov to publicly demonstrate his latest documentary in
the territory of Uzbekistan. Following this decision another
government run agency – the State Agency for Intellectual Property
Rights have also denied to register Mahmudov’s rights as an author of
this documentary referring to the earler decision by Uzbekkino.
Mahmudov and his colleagues say both decisions were unfair and
prompted by the current political preferences of the Uzbek
authorities.
Mahmudov is an author and owner of unique personal archive of
video-materials picturing the history of creation and first years of
activities of the Uzbek democratic political opposition. Several of
his documentaries featuring such materials have become indeed popular
among the opposition and independent mass media. As an independent
cinematograph Mahmudov has faced pressure of the law enforcement
bodies in the past. He and his colleagues think the latest pressure of
Mirabad DDIA is also related to his creative and public activities.

Cases of persecution including a criminal persecution of Uzbekistani
human rights activists, independent journalists and photographers are
not rare. Latest examples include criminal persecution of Uzbekistani
journalists Elena Bondar, Viktor Krimzalov, Abdumalik Boboev and a
photographer Umida Akhmedova.

The Expert Working Group calls on the Uzbek authorities, in particular
the Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
National Security Service to provide official explanation on the
reasons of summon to Mirabad DDIA for Abdulaziz Mahmudov and
immediately stop his persecution. We also call on all other
stakeholders, including the western embassies, international
organizations and mass media to assist in protection of Mahmudov from
the above mentioned persecution.